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Abstract
Do rms respond to cost shocks by reducing the quality of their products? Using mi-
crodata from a large Russian retailer that varies its oerings twice-yearly, we document that
ruble devaluations are associated with a reduction in the observed material quality of prod-
ucts imported for resale, but that higher quality goods are also more protable. We reconcile
these facts using a simple multi-product sourcing model that features a demand system with
expenditure switching, where more protable products can be dropped more quickly after
a cost shock. The estimated model shows that quality downgrading reduces average pass-
through by 6% and has meaningful consequences for welfare. JEL Codes: E30, F14, F31, L11,
L15, L16, L81, M11.
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1 Introduction
How do rms respond to cost shocks and what are the most relevant margins of adjustment?
Economists1 and the business press2 have long speculated that companies may reduce the quality
of their product oerings instead of raising prices in response to adverse exchange rate move-
ments. This hypothesis complements a long literature on incomplete price pass-through in in-
ternational nance by providing another margin of adjustment for rms.3
While quality downgrading may oer an explanation for long-run incomplete pass-through,
there are two challenges in testing the hypothesis: rst, it has been dicult to accurately measure
quality; second, any positive evidence of quality downgrading must be reconciled with the quality
sorting literature, which shows that higher quality products tend to be more protable.4 Since a
cost shock that hits all imports proportionately will typically not change product prot rankings,
quality sorting would seem to rule out quality downgrading. Our contribution is to directly test
for quality downgrading using new and uniquely granular microdata, as well as to build and
estimate a tractable model of product sourcing that can accommodate high quality products being
ex ante more protable—as in the quality sorting literature and our own data—but also dropping
out more quickly post shock.
We use novel data from a large Russian online apparel retailer as a laboratory for studying
whether quality adjustments are operational during an exchange rate shock. We directly observe
the fabric and material composition of hundreds of thousands of individual products oered by
the rm, as well as prices, quantities and unit costs. Following Crozet, Head, and Mayer (2011),
Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2011), and Medina (2018), who use expert opinions or product
descriptions to classify goods as high or low quality, we combine intuitive restriction on which
fabrics are high quality with high frequency changes in rm product stocking to identify the
eect of the 2014 Russian currency crisis on the quality conguration of oered products.
We rst conrm that high quality imports tend to be more protable and more expensive in
our data, as in the quality sorting literature. Since the prot ranking of dierent products does
not change in response to a proportional cost shock in a canonical trade model (Crozet, Head,
1Feenstra (1988) argues that rms may upgrade their products through changing the design or adding extra
features when there is a decline in the quantity sold, in his example as a result of quotas.
2In the aftermath of Brexit, the devalued pound was cited as a reason for shrinking candy bars. See, for example,
the Financial Times article “Food groups embrace ‘shrinkation’ to cope with rising costs” on December 2 of 2016.
3For recent entries on incomplete price pass-through see, for example, Goldberg and Campa (2010), Gopinath
and Itskhoki (2010a,b), Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014), and Auer, Burstein, and Lein (2017).
4Manova and Zhang (2012); Crozet, Head, and Mayer (2011)
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and Mayer, 2011), quality sorting suggests there should not be quality downgrading.
We then show that high quality imports are dropped more quickly relative to low quality ones
within narrow categories after the Russian ruble devaluation increases import costs in 2014. A 1%
ruble devaluation causes a roughly 0.35% dierential reduction in the fraction of natural fabrics in
imported versus domestically produced items. The analysis relies on a dierence-in-dierences
strategy with Russian manufactured products as a control group, which rules out common shocks
as the explanation for the compositional shift. Quality downgrading is consistent with long-run
sticky average prices found in the literature.
Having documented quality downgrading, we next turn to the question of why the rm would
react to the exchange rate shock by reallocating towards lower quality products. We rule out
“ight from quality” due to falling incomes as the primary mechanism by exploiting a concurrent
oil price shock, which aects labor earnings dierentially across oil-producing regions of Rus-
sia.5 Auxiliary regressions indicate no dierential pass-through across qualities and document a
reallocation of quantities from high to low quality within product categories, suggesting instead
that high quality products were dropped because demand for high quality goods was relatively
more sensitive to the price increase as in Bems and di Giovanni (2016) or Medina (2018).
To explain the data we build and estimate a model of import sourcing where high quality
products can be ex ante more protable, but can also be dropped more quickly after a cost shock.
The key ingredient is a Khandelwal (2010) style logit demand system that supports expenditure
switching as in Bems and di Giovanni (2016). This type of demand system has been used suc-
cessfully to explain how trade responds to dierences in incomes, and here we show it can also
explain why ex ante more protable products are disproportionately dropped in response to a
proportional cost shock.6 Importantly, no income shock is required to generate the product re-
allocation. On the supply side, including a product aects demand for every other product; this
non-separability in sourcing decisions implies a dicult combinatorial discrete choice problem
with complementarities as in Antras, Fort, and Tintelnot (2017). By assuming an incomplete infor-
mation structure within the rm, we retain demand complementarities but dramatically simplify
computation.
The recovered model parameters are consistent with our quality classication in the reduced
5Such phenomena are well-known in the literature (see Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005)), and similar
mechanisms have been emphasized by Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015), who nd that consumers reallocate
expenditure across stores in response to economic conditions.
6See, for example, Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011); Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2011); Auer, Chaney,
and Sauré (2018).
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form exercises: all else equal, natural fabric goods sell 12% percent more and have 82% percent
higher marginal costs than articial fabric goods, implying that natural fabrics are both more
valued by consumers and more expensive.7 Low xed sourcing costs rationalize observed product
entry and exit, as well as relatively low sales per product.
The estimated model allows us to decompose the role of quality downgrading in mediating
price pass-through. We show that pass through into average prices is roughly 6% lower with
quality reallocations compared to a base case with no entry or exit of products. For a high quality
product that is replaced with a low quality product, pass-through becomes negative. Comple-
menting the price pass-through results, the model also provides novel insights on how quality
mediates the welfare eects of a devaluation. In particular, we show that the bias arising from
omitting quality heterogeneity in counterfactuals cannot be signed in general.
This paper contributes to a large literature that explores why pass-through from exchange
rate shocks into prices is incomplete. A variety of consistent explanations for incomplete pass-
through have been tested using both rm-product Gopinath and Rigobon (2008); Gopinath and
Itskhoki (2010a,b) and rm-category (e.g., HS-8 or HS-10) level prices Knetter (1989); Goldberg,
Knetter, et al. (1997); Auer and Chaney (2009); Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012); Amiti, Itskhoki,
and Konings (2014, 2016). Our result that quality downgrading can lead to incomplete price pass-
through is most applicable to price stickiness within product categories, since our evidence relates
to product adding and dropping and not direct replacement. However, the model is consistent
with within-rm-product upgrading and downgrading, and thus remains relevant to the within-
rm-product long run pass-through ndings. Indeed, Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) nd that
rms often replace products instead of changing prices, giving rms ample opportunity to adjust
quality levels.
The present work is also linked to research that focuses on quality sorting of products and
quality upgrading. Manova and Zhang (2012) and Crozet, Head, and Mayer (2011) demonstrate
cross-sectional quality sorting within rms: high quality products are exported to more desti-
nations and have higher trade values, which in their frameworks is rationalized by the products
being more protable. Fan, Li, and Yeaple (2015), Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015), Manova and Yu
(2017) show that rms may upgrade quality after a trade shock given production function comple-
mentarities; their focus is not price pass-through, but rather how trade aects rm level residuals,
7Here we recover marginal costs by inverting the demand system, so that these are true marginal costs and not
wholesale costs from our data.
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either quality or productivity.8 Medina (2018) addresses the same focus, but relies on an expen-
diture switching demand system to induce rms to change their input quality mix in response
to an import price shock. While we draw on this literature’s robust nding that higher quality
products tend to be more protable—especially in wealthier countries—we do not speak to the
trade literature on how rms produce quality or productivity as our rm purchases its products
from wholesalers.
A key diculty in the trade literature on quality has been actually identifying which goods are
high quality, and quantifying what that implies for demand. In an inuential paper, Khandelwal
(2010) pioneers using a demand residual, while Medina (2018), Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2011)
and Alessandria and Kaboski (2011) make an assumption based on the description of the goods
(e.g., pima cotton versus other fabrics, and fresh versus frozen fruit) and Crozet, Head, and Mayer
(2011) uses expert opinions. Our paper bridges these approaches by separating out goods into
natural and articial fabrics using their descriptions, but then also quantifying the eect of natural
fabrics in a demand regression in our structural model. This approach is similar to that of Auer,
Chaney, and Sauré (2018), who nd quality aects price pass-through, as do Ludema and Yu (2016)
and Chen and Juvenal (2016).
Other papers have studied the role of quality in in an international setting. One prominent
strand, including Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2011), Chen and Juvenal (2015) and Bems and
di Giovanni (2016), has found some evidence that the disproportionate drop in the value of trade
after the global negative income shock in 2008 was caused by the higher quality of traded goods
combined with non-homotheticity of demand. Previous work has also examined the relation-
ship between trade distances and quality (Alchian and Allen (1964), Hummels and Skiba (2004),
and Feenstra and Romalis (2014)). Another strand has shown that rms may choose to upgrade
the quality of their exported products, either because exchange rate shocks make exporting to
richer countries more attractive (Bastos, Silva, and Verhoogen, 2018) or because competing with
inexpensive imports drives rms to upgrade, as in Medina (2018).9
Finally, this paper complements other structural IO papers that evaluate exchange-rate shocks
in particular industries such as beer (Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2013) and coee (Nakamura and
8For productivity see, e.g., Bustos (2011).
9Other trade shocks that can drive rms to quality upgrade include rising competition from low-wage countries
(as in Martin and Mejean (2014)), cheaper intermediate inputs (see Verhoogen (2008), Fieler, Eslava, and Xu (2014)
and Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015)) or access to larger markets (see Bustos (2011), Lileeva and Treer (2010), and Aw,
Roberts, and Xu (2011)).
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Zerom, 2010) but which do not allow for quality downgrading or entry and exit.10 We also con-
nect to Gopinath, Gourinchas, Hsieh, and Li (2011) and Burstein and Jaimovich (2012) insofar as
both papers use the decision-making of a single retailer to answer empirical questions in a trade
context—in their cases, pricing to market.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the data and institutional
background. Section 3 presents direct evidence on quality downgrading in the Russian online ap-
parel industry. Section 4 describes the structural model and derives the conditions on parameters
under which it will predict quality downgrading. Section 5 provides details on the estimation,
recovered parameters, and counterfactuals. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Data
Our data come from a large, online apparel retailer that sells across all of Russia.11 The retailer
oers clothing, shoes, and accessories. At the retailer-assigned stock-keeping unit (SKU) level,
we observe the price, which is constant across Russia but can vary month to month, as well as
the quantity sold in each province (oblast) in each month.12 SKUs are comparable to UPCs in
that each one describes a specic product—e.g., a particular variety of Adidas running shoe—
aggregating only over dierent colors and sizes of the same product. The data cover January
2012 through September 2015; from September 2014 to March 2015 the ruble devalued by over
50% after holding roughly steady against the U.S. dollar since the early 2000s.
In addition to prices and quantities of SKUs, we observe a product’s inventory, fabric compo-
sition, country of manufacture, brand (e.g., Adidas), product group (e.g., shoes), wholesale cost in
rubles, and which currency the the rm used to purchase each SKU.13 A more precise description
of these variables and how they are used in the analysis is provided below.
10Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter (1996) looks at pass-through for cars, and notes that quality adjustments may
aect price pass-through numbers.
11The company is owned by a publicly traded German enterprise, listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. As of
today, the retailer operates in four countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine), although the present study
focuses exclusively on the largest market, which is Russia. The rm is one of two leading online apparel retailers in
Russia, wielding signicant market power in many of Russia’s regions, and employing more than 4,000 people as of
December 2015.
12Even though the data is suciently granular to facilitate the tracking of purchases for each consumer over time,
we aggregate up to the regional level and exploit shocks to local GDP to identify any potential income induced
demand reallocation. We nd no evidence of an income-shock induced “ight from quality” in section 3.3.
13Most imported SKUs are invoiced either in Euros or the U.S. dollar, and the ruble depreciated almost one-for-one
against both. The prevalence of dominant currencies in international transactions is consistent with recent evidence
from international nance (e.g., see Casas, Díez, Gopinath, and Gourinchas (2017)).
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2.1 Store features
The store operates by ordering SKUs at a wholesale cost from both large and small brands and
then reselling to Russian consumers with a markup. Most SKUs are uniquely associated by the
rm with the Fall/Winter or Spring/Summer season within a year, which are the two main seasons
in the fashion industry (Bhardwaj and Fairhurst, 2010). Before a season begins, the rm chooses
which brands and SKUs to include, and, once the goods start being oered, the rm is free to
choose pricing.14
We associate the Spring season with the period from March through August, and Fall with
September through February of the following year.15 Figure 1 shows that the majority of revenue
for a season’s SKUs happens during the six month window associated with that season. The only
slight discrepancy from this pattern occurs in the Fall 2015 season since we only observe 17 full
days in September of 2015 after which our data end.16
There are two features of the store worth mentioning. First, for most SKUs the rm does all
of its stocking up in one initial wave, before the season starts, at a prearranged unit wholesale
cost from existing brands. We thus expect any exchange rate pass-through or quality changes to
occur with a lag. Second, the product line is almost completely refreshed each season with new
SKUs that are associated with the new season, which gives the rm the scope to reallocate fabrics
but prevents us from tracking SKUs over long periods.17
2.2 Product quality and summary statistics
We have price, quantity, material and origin information for 444,629 SKUs spread over 1,583
brands and 26 product groups. The most common fabrics are presented in Appendix A. Cotton,
polyester, and leather dominate, with at least one of the three present in 50% of SKUs.
We follow Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2011) and Alessandria and Kaboski (2011) and classify
products as high or low quality based on their product description, and specically based on the
14As far as we are aware from interviews with the management team, the rm is not bound by any resale-price
maintenance agreements with the manufacturers. We also nd that, on average, the retailer charges a markup of
two (i.e., doubling wholesale costs) until the goods are put on sale and phased out as the season draws to an end.
1578% of Spring SKUs and 75% of Fall SKUs are introduced in our designated Spring and Fall months, respectively.
83% of Spring revenue and 78% of Fall revenue are earned in our designated Spring and Fall months, respectively.
Additional graphs of the distribution of Fall and Spring introductions and revenue shares are available in Appendix A.
16Since a season’s SKUs continue to be introduced beyond the rst month of the season, the Fall 2015 revenue
share appears low for the nal bar of Figure A.2 in Appendix A.
17Related features of the microdata have recently been emphasized in work studying how rms grow through the
introduction of new product lines (e.g., Argente, Lee, and Moreira (2018)).
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Figure 1: Monthly revenue shares for SKUs by season
Note: This gure shows histograms of the distribution of Fall and Spring introductions by revenue.
The gray area covers the months we choose to associate with Spring goods of March-August.
primary material used in the product. To proceed, we rst code polyester, plastic polymers, and
any fabric with the word “articial” as low quality. We assume an SKU containing a low quality
material is a low quality product, except SKUs containing polyester, in which case we require
that polyester is the only component for it to be low quality. Where an articial fabric appears
overwhelmingly as part of a blend and is included to provide a specic property—for instance,
elastane, which provides stretchiness—it is coded as high quality. Our precise mapping from the
30 most commonly occurring fabrics, present in 97% of SKUs and accounting for all materials in
93% of SKUs, into the high/low quality categories is given in Table A.1 in Appendix A.
As in the fabric quality upgrading analysis of Medina (2018), our split reects that naturally-
derived materials such as leather, silk, and cotton have superior attributes compared to fake
leather, polymers, and polyester. We verify that our high quality coded products have a larger
demand shifter than low quality products using demand regressions in section 5, which maps to
the Khandelwal (2010) method of eliciting quality as the demand residual conditional on price in
a logit regression.
Table 1 presents summary statistics by product group. The Share column gives the number
of SKUs in that group divided by the total number of SKUs oered over the whole sample period,
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Table 1: Cross-sectional summary statistics
Group Share Quality Rus. Group Share Quality Rus.
Ankle Boots 0.012 0.727 0.091 Outwear 0.060 0.577 0.031
Bags 0.080 0.468 0.060 Sandals 0.019 0.500 0.041
Ballerina Shoes 0.016 0.600 0.039 Scarves 0.022 0.813 0.091
Blazers and Suits 0.011 0.866 0.052 Shirts 0.056 0.769 0.037
Boots 0.039 0.823 0.036 Shoes 0.048 0.787 0.058
Dresses 0.078 0.774 0.117 Shorts 0.018 0.834 0.015
Flip Flops 0.011 0.369 0.068 Skirts 0.020 0.769 0.087
Headwear 0.025 0.894 0.225 Sport Shoes 0.062 0.645 0.014
Heeled Sandals 0.033 0.668 0.057 Sweatshirts 0.032 0.890 0.036
High Boots 0.044 0.775 0.076 Polos 0.114 0.950 0.039
Jeans 0.022 0.988 0.005 Jumpsuits 0.046 0.880 0.051
Knitwear 0.068 0.949 0.039 Underwear 0.016 0.952 0.005
Moccasins 0.018 0.853 0.040 Vests and Tops 0.026 0.793 0.045
Note: This table presents summary statistics by product group. The Share column gives the fraction
of SKUs in a group compared to all SKUs oered over the whole sample period, the Quality column
lists the high quality fabric SKU share of each product group, and the Rus. column contains the
fraction of Russian manufactured products.
the Quality column gives the high quality fabric SKU share of each product group, and the Rus.
column gives the fraction of Russian manufactured products.18
Our panel analysis focuses on the season level SKU stocking choices of the rm, so we aggre-
gate SKUs sales and prices and associate the aggregated values with our assigned time windows.
Our baseline results use the rst observed price as that SKU’s within-season price.19 Summary
statistics at the season level are presented in Table 2. The number of SKUs drops precipitously
in the September 2015 season, which reects the fact that our data end in September, but SKUs
associated with a season continue to be introduced after the rst month.20 Total sales and num-
ber of SKUs are on a sharp upward trend, as the rm is expanding during this time period. It
is also worth pointing out that the fraction of high-quality products clearly decreases from its
previous steady state during the rst 2015 season, which is the initial post-devaluation period
and is indicative of quality downgrading in the aggregate. While this happens, the unweighted
18The Russian apparel industry is made up of numerous manufacturers that tend to be quite labor intensive, with
the sector employing around 236,158 workers in medium to large enterprises in 2015 (according to BvD’s Amadeus
data). For comparison, and according to the U.S. Department of Labor, apparel manufacturers in the United States
employed about 142,860 workers in 2014.
19The results are robust to using a within-season sales-weighted average.
20See Figure A.1 in the Appendix A.
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Table 2: Time-varying summary statistics
Season Quality No. SKUs Units Sold Price Raw Cost Avg. RUB/USD
2012-03-01 0.816 27, 089 339, 747 3, 874 1, 775 31.170
2012-09-01 0.804 33, 592 421, 807 4, 164 1, 957 30.840
2013-03-01 0.772 63, 584 1, 232, 188 3, 285 1, 433 31.947
2013-09-01 0.776 60, 638 1, 233, 759 4, 750 1, 914 33.225
2014-03-01 0.764 69, 945 1, 895, 759 3, 631 1, 465 35.324
2014-09-01 0.777 74, 885 2, 082, 531 4, 578 1, 941 51.704
2015-03-01 0.738 88, 122 2, 826, 627 4, 512 1, 898 56.898
2015-09-01 0.708 13, 100 411, 986 4, 590 1, 983 69.885
Note: This table presents summary statistics at the season level over time. The Season column contains
the start date of each respective season, the Quality column lists the fraction of high-quality goods
for each season, the number of units sold per season is contained in the fourth column, the average
SKU price is in the fth, the wholesale cost is in the Raw Cost column, and the average U.S. dollar to
ruble exchange rate over a season is shown in the last column.
average wholesale cost for this 2015 Spring season rises to 1,898 rubles, far exceeding values of
1,433 and 1,465 rubles for Spring 2013 and Spring 2014, respectively. Since Table 1 shows that
dierent product groups have very dierent mean levels of quality, to assess the magnitude of
downgrading accurately we will control for reallocation between product groups in Section 3.
2.3 Macroeconomic environment
In 2014, a decline in investor condence led to a rapid fall in the value of the Russian ruble.
Falling condence in the Russian economy stemmed from two major sources: rst, the price of
crude oil, a key Russian export, declined by nearly 50% from June 2014 to December 2014; second,
the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 precipitated Western asset freezes on Russian energy
and banking sectors that were implemented by July 2014.21 In response, Russia implemented a
wide-ranging food import ban against the EU, although no other trade was restricted.
Figure 2 shows how these developments were mirrored in a steep ruble depreciation against
the U.S. dollar between July and December 2014. From the vantage point of our rm, which earns
revenue in rubles but buys wholesale in foreign currencies, this abrupt movement represents an
exogenous cost shock that was fully realized by the time the company was sourcing products for
its Spring/Summer 2015 season.22 Incidentally, the food import ban, oil price shock, and nancial
21See, for example, the New York Times article “Raising Stakes on Russia, U.S. Adds Sanctions” on July 17 of 2014.
22As is well-known from the broader exchange rate disconnect puzzle, nominal exchange rates follow a volatile
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Figure 2: Cost of goods sold
Note: This gure shows the normalized U.S. dollar to ruble exchange rate (black solid line), the mean
seasonal (red dashed line), the inventory-weighted mean seasonal (blue short-dashed line), and the
purchase quantity-weighted mean seasonal (green long-dashed line) wholesale costs of all SKUs from
mid-2012 until 1 Sept 2015.
sanctions on the Russian economy that began in July 2014 may also have represented a substantial
income shock to consumers as early as during the Fall 2014 season, which is before any of the
quality downgrading is observed.
Besides documenting the exchange rate shock, Figure 2 also provides for an initial look at how
the rm responded to the devaluation. A number of patterns are revealed: rst, there is a lot of
periodicity in the average wholesale cost of goods sold, with Spring/Summer items always being
cheaper on average than goods associated with Fall/Winter seasons; second, the steep nominal
devaluation at the end of 2014 led to an increase in average wholesale costs during the subsequent
Spring 2015 season (mean COGs). Yet costs did not go up nearly as much as one might expect
under complete pass-through into import prices. Furthermore, inventory-weighted wholesale
costs increased even less in percentage terms than unweighted mean costs. This reects that
average stocking quantities per SKU increased in relative terms for cheaper, lower quality goods,
random walk process that is uncorrelated with macroeconomic fundamentals and is hence largely unpredictable.
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which hints at non-homothetic adjustment mechanisms.23
3 Reduced Form Evidence
In this section we provide evidence that the rm reacted to the nominal exchange rate shock
by reducing the quality of the products it imported for resale. In particular, we identify four
empirical facts in our data:
1. High-quality goods are more protable than low-quality goods.
2. Imported goods experience a greater quality reduction compared to Russian-produced
goods, and goods for which quality is more costly to provide experience the greatest quality
reduction.
3. Regions in Russia that experience greater income shocks do not dierentially reallocate
consumption to lower quality goods.
4. High-quality goods do not experience dierential pass-through.
Fact 1 implies that our data exhibits the same features as the quality sorting literature where high
quality goods are more protable (Manova and Zhang, 2012). In workhorse models of interna-
tional trade, this would imply high quality goods would not be dropped after an adverse shock
(Crozet, Head, and Mayer, 2011). Facts 2 and 3 establish that the exchange rate shock induces
quality downgrading, and rule out an income shock induced “ight from quality” à la Burstein,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005) as the sole explanation for quality downgrading. Fact 4 suggests
that dierential movements in the relative markups of high and low quality goods cannot explain
the disproportionate exit of high quality goods.
3.1 Quality and protability
Since we observe wholesale costs of a product cj directly, we can approximate the variable prots
of a good j as pij = qj(pj − cj).24 In all following sections, we will refer to high quality prod-
23This pattern is not driven by a large scale removal of high cost goods from the retailer’s warehouses (which
could be rationalized with consumers moving forward consumption), but rather by a disproportionate amount of
stocking-up on low cost goods—the close association between average quantity- and inventory-weighted wholesale
costs conrms this interpretation.
24Price varies over a product’s life within season; we use sales prices that are actually observed and faced by
consumers to compute prots.
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Table 3: Mean dierences for high quality products
Dependent variable:
log(pi) log(q) log(p)
(1) (2) (3)
Naturalj 0.046∗ -0.339∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.027) (0.026)
Group FE X X X
Season FE X X X
Observations 305,376 305,376 305,376
R2 0.365 0.170 0.383
Note: This table presents coecient estimates from specication 1. The outcome variables is either
the prot, quantity sold, or price of SKU j, in product group g, in season t. Product group and season
xed eects are included. Prices are sales-weighted within SKUs, and standard errors are clustered
at the group level. ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
ucts interchangeably as “natural,” in line with our classication method. We run the following
regression at the SKU-level:
log(yjgt) = β ·Naturalj +
∑
g
αgDg +
∑
t
αtDt + jgt (1)
where yjgt is either the prot, quantity sold, or price of SKU j, in product group g, in season t,
Dg and Dt are product group and season xed eects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered
at the group level to allow for serial correlation across time. The results are reported in Table 3;
high quality goods are found to be about 4.5% more protable on average. Controlling for brand
and product group xed eects, so that only within brand variation is used, implies a similar
estimated magnitude signicant at the 0.1% level (see Appendix B).
Note from the quantity regression in Table 3 that high quality goods sell fewer units than
low quality goods. Thus, even if there is a per-unit distribution or storage cost in the complete
marginal cost, it will not reverse the prot ordering.
3.2 Quality downgrading
We show in this section that the share of high-quality goods on oer was reduced in response to
the exchange rate shock. Our identication strategy relies on a dierence-in-dierences (DiD) ap-
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proach, where imported SKUs are the treatment and domestically produced SKUs are the control
group. The fraction of products that are high quality (natural fabric) is the dependent variable. In-
tuitively, items manufactured abroad and purchased by the rm in a foreign currency will have a
larger increase in ruble costs post-shock than domestically produced items purchased in rubles;25
if quality adjustment is an important margin for passing through the ruble cost increase, then
there will be a negative, signicant coecient for the foreign sourced goods post-shock.
In our rst specication, we aggregate within seasons to the product group-origin level.26 For
each of the 26 product groups, we will have two observations in each of the eight seasons: the
fraction of high quality SKUs for products with a domestic origin, and the fraction of high quality
SKUs for imported products. In order not to impose a timing assumption on when the rm passes
through the shock, we run a specication with time-varying treatment eects:
natfracgrt =
∑
t>1
δt (nonrusgr · Dgt) +
∑
gr
αgrDgr +
∑
gt
αgtDgt + grt (2)
where g indexes a product group (e.g., high boots), r indicates either foreign or domestic manufac-
turing origin, and t is a season. natfracgrt is the fraction of oered SKUs that use a natural fabric
for product group g, origin r, in season t, δt are the time-varying treatment eects, nonrusgr is
an indicator with a value of one for the set of non-Russian (imported) products in group g, Dgt
are product group-season specic dummies, and Dgr are dummies for each product group-origin
combination. The latter sets of indicators are included to account for systematic dierences in
quality across product groups, as well as for changes in this quality level within groups over time
and by origin.
Specication 2 uses only within group-origin variation to identify downgrading. Because
the specication includes group-origin and group-season dummies, it is equivalent to running
a separate DiD within each product group, using foreign-sourced products as the treatment in
each case, and then averaging the treatment eects across product groups. Treatment eects that
are the result of seasonal reallocations from high natfrac to low natfrac product groups are
therefore ruled out, as are explanations that are common across the treatment and control within
a product group, such as changing tastes, changing incomes, or changing commodity/raw fabric
costs that are contemporaneous with the devaluation.
25We conrm that this is true in pass-through regressions in Section 3.4.
26While this aggregation helps to transform the data into a tractable format for regression analysis, the results
hold for alternative levels of rm stocking choices.
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Figure 3: Quality downgrading
Note: This gure plots the estimated δt coecients of equation 2 with 95% condence intervals
around them. Fixed eects are at the product group×country of origin and season level. Standard
errors are clustered by group×origin to allow within-group-origin serial correlation.
The estimated coecients δt from equation 2 are plotted in Figure 3, along with their associ-
ated standard errors, clustered at the group×origin level to allow for within-group-origin serial
correlation over time. The results indicate that there is no statistically signicant dierential re-
duction in quality within product groups for non-Russian (imported) goods until the March 2015
season, after the peak of the devaluation. That is, there was a signicant reduction in the quality
of imported products, and it happened on a time frame consistent with the rm’s one-season-
ahead stocking decisions. The lack of a signicant treatment eect prior to March 2015 validates
the use of domestic products as a control group as part of our identication strategy, and rules
out a pre-trend as the explanation for the eect.
To quantify the impact of the devaluation on imported products, we next run specications
that allow the magnitude of the lagged exchange rate movement to play a role:
natfracgrt = δ (nonrusgr · log(ERt−1)) +
∑
gr
αgrDgr +
∑
gt
αgtDgt + grt (3)
log(ERt−1) is the average U.S. dollar to ruble exchange rate during the prior season. The coe-
cient δ no longer has a t subscript, and can be approximately interpreted as the percent change
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in natfracgrt that results from a one percent change in the lagged exchange rate. We express
the dependent variable in levels in our baseline specication, but all results go through if we use
log(natfracgrt) instead.27
We run equation 3 for three dierent levels of aggregation: i) one that does not distinguish be-
tween product groups at all (no g), so that each season has one observation for the imported high
quality fraction and one for the domestic high quality fraction; ii) one where g indicates product
groups as in equation 2; iii) and one where g indicates specic brands within a product group.28
These specications are saturated with xed eects and therefore allow for quality reallocations
between product groups, within product groups and between brands, and within brands only for
the three regressions, respectively.
Our base specication in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 correspond to the within-product
group model, and imply that a one percent devaluation in the prior season leads to a roughly 0.35%
reduction in the fraction of high quality oerings. In column (1), we recover a negative, signicant
δ coecient that is not statistically dierent from the estimates in (2) and (3), suggesting that
reallocation between product groups with dierent average quality levels is not a key margin for
quality downgrading for the rm. In column (4), δ is estimated as insignicant, implying that
within-brand reallocations are less important for downgrading.29
If the increase in costs from the exchange rate shock—rather than an income shock or a change
in the nature of demand—is causing quality downgrading, one might expect that for product
groups where quality is more expensive to provide, there will be more downgrading. We test this
relationship by allowing for the treatment coecient in equation 3 to vary by product group in
our product group level specication:
natfracgrt =
∑
g
δg (nonrusgr · log(ERt−1)) +
∑
gr
αgrDgr +
∑
t
αgtDgt + grt (4)
For each product group, we recover the quality premium by dividing the average wholesale cost
for high versus low quality goods in the seasons prior to March 2015. A value greater than one
indicates that high quality goods cost more on average than low quality goods in that product
27We also run regressions using the number of high and low quality SKUs instead of the fraction, which we discuss
in the robustness section. The results are available in Appendix B.
28For example, Adidas and Puma are two brands within sport shoes, but here a brand will have dierent xed
eects for all the product groups where it sells items.
29Results for specication 3 using the logged fraction of natural oerings, and results dropping the last season of
incomplete data are reported in Appendix B. Both are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our baseline ndings.
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Table 4: Dierential quality downgrading
Dependent variable:
natfracgrt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nonrusgr · log(ERt−1) -0.285∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗ 0.204
(0.059) (0.064) (0.115) (1.029)
Origin FE X
Season FE X X
Group × Origin FE X X
Group × Season FE X X
Brand × Origin FE X
Observations 16 395 395 24,820
R2 0.911 0.692 0.864 0.999
Note: This table presents coecient estimates from specication 3, aggregating SKUs within non-
Russian (imported) or Russian origin in column (1), within product group-origin in columns (2) and
(3), and within brand-origin in column (4). The outcome is the fraction of oered SKUs that use a
natural fabric for group or brand g, origin r, in season t. nonrusgr is an indicator with a value of
one for the set of non-Russian products in group or brand g, and log(ERt−1) is the average exchange
rate during season t−1. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at product group or brand×origin
level to allow for serial correlation across time. ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5%
levels, respectively.
group. For most product groups (20 out of 26), quality is costly.
We plot the estimated coecients δg against the quality premium in Figure 4.30 The strong
negative relationship between the costs of providing quality and the amount of quality down-
grading supports the hypothesis that costs played a central role in the rm’s decision to quality
downgrade after the devaluation. Our result that product groups with the highest costs down-
grade the most after a proportional increase in input wholesale costs agrees with the evidence
in Fan, Li, and Yeaple (2018), who nd that rms with the highest costs upgrade the most after a
proportional reduction in input prices.
Quality downgrading robustness
Our identication is based on the assumption that the exchange rate shock does not aect the
wholesale cost of Russian-manufactured products as much as foreign-manufactured products. We
provide evidence that pass-through from the devaluation into Russian product wholesale costs is
30The full regression results from equation 4 are available in Table B.2 in Appendix B.
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Figure 4: Cross-group variation in downgrading
Note: This gure plots the estimated δg coecients of equation 4. Fixed eects are at the group×origin
and season level. Standard errors are clustered by group×origin level to allow within-group-origin
serial correlation.
lower but still positive in Table 5 in the next section. Since Russian products may use imported
intermediates combined with Russian labor this is to be expected, and suggests that our quality
downgrading coecient in Table 4 is a lower bound since the control group experiences a cost
shock as well.
One concern is that the treatment eects are driven by quality upgrading in the control group,
rather than downgrading in the treatment group, especially since the control group is relatively
small. We perform several checks to address this issue. First, in Appendix B we provide a raw DiD
data graph for polymers (Figure B.1), which appear as a rubber and leather substitute in product
groups using leather (approx. 40% of total SKUs). Polymers have a signicant presence by end of
sample (in 8% of SKUs) and show a clear dierential trend, with imports increasing their share
while domestic products keep the share roughly constant. This check provides some assurance
that the DiD is picking up dierential downgrading in the treatment group.
We also run a DiD using only imported goods, treating the logged number of high or low
quality SKUs within a group as our dependent variable. The growth in imported natural fabric
SKUs is negative and signicant compared to imported articial fabric SKUs, so that Table 4
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reects imports’ natural fabric share is actually shrinking, and not simply growing less quickly
than domestic products’ natural fabric share. Full results are reported in Appendix B.
3.3 Demand channel
One might suspect the observed compositional changes stem from a large demand shift towards
cheaper or lower quality goods as a result of an income shock to consumers, rather than a cost
shock to apparel manufacturers. In this section we assess the quantitative importance of this
mechanism by looking at regions that were more adversely aected during the crisis and com-
paring their demand patterns to regions that had higher economic growth. We nd little evidence
of dierential consumption reallocation toward cheaper goods in Russian regions (oblasts) suf-
fering from extremely low or even negative economic growth in 2015. The basic approach entails
a DiD estimation strategy of the following form:
log(Qualit) = αi +
∑
t
γtDt +
∑
t
δt (Dt ·Growthi) +X ′itθ +
∑
t
ψt (Dt ·Xit) + it (5)
∀i, ∀t ∈ {2012m1, . . . , 2015m9} \ {2014m12}
where Qualit is either the median or mean quality (natfrac) in region i at time t, αi are region
xed eects,Growthi is the nominal regional GDP growth in 2015,Dt is an indicator for the time
period (year-month), with 2014m12 taken as the omitted category, (Dt ·Growthi) represents an
interaction term between the time indicators and a region’s economic performance in 2015, and
Xit is a matrix of control variables that includes total regional sales (in logs), as well as regional
unemployment and income levels.31 All standard errors are clustered at the region-level to allow
for serial correlation across time.
The Russian currency crisis had a vastly dierential impact on various regions of the coun-
try. This provides for a clean distinction between exposed (low growth) and unexposed (high
growth) oblasts that can be utilized when estimating specication 5. Panel (A) of Figure 5 shows
a map with geographic regions that grew relatively fast (in dark colors) as well as slowly (in light
colors) in 2015. Exclusively devoting attention to oblasts with positive retail sales, the steepest
contraction saw regional GDP growth of −10.1% whereas the oblast with the highest growth
expanded by 16.1%. The standard deviation of income growth was 3.26 over this period.
31The results are unaected by inclusion of these additional controls and interaction terms. Appendix B.4 further
presents estimates for the median and mean regular prices in region i at time t as alternative outcome variables.
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As would be necessary with any DiD estimation approach, this specication also provides
evidence on the parallel trends assumption in all outcome variables. That is, in the absence of
treatment the unobserved disparities between high- and low-growth regions should be constant
over time—the validity of the estimation procedure relies on outcome variables that would have
continued to develop as they did before the economic shock in all regions. Unless this assumption
is valid, the estimated treatment eects would be biased versions of the true impact. As an addi-
tional robustness check on the identication strategy, all control variables are interacted with the
Dt indicators to allow for possible heterogeneous responses to negative economic shocks across
distinct regions (e.g., poor versus rich oblasts could react dierently to the crisis).
The main parameters of interest are the δt since they capture the dierence between crisis
exposed and relatively unscathed regions over time. The estimated xed-eects model includes
leads going back to early 2012 and lags reaching the last available month, September 2015. The
specication allows for any causal direction of the ndings and assesses if the eects grow or
fade over time.
One may also entertain a causal interpretation of the δt estimates in equation 5 for other im-
portant reasons. Firstly, about 93% of goods sold by the retailer are not produced in Russia, and
even when the good is home made it is almost never manufactured in the region under consider-
ation. Hence the specication will not suer from endogeneity issues typically associated with
regressions of prices on economic activity. For instance, unobserved productivity innovations
for a specic SKU are unlikely to be correlated with local growth rates. In principle, aggregate
shocks could lead to simultaneous movements in prices of goods and local economic growth. But
since time xed eects are included, they should eliminate this endogeneity issue too. Finally,
the retailer does not price discriminate across geographic regions within Russia and thus any
observed divergence in regional median and mean quality can only be explained by changes in
quantities (purchases).
The ndings are summarized in Figure 5, which plots the key estimated parameters of in-
terest, δ̂t, with 95% condence intervals around them. As would be consistent with the parallel
trends assumption, the estimates in Panel (B) show no robust dierences between the positively
exposed (high growth) and negatively hit (low growth) regions in the months prior to the onset
of Russia’s currency crisis. Then, starting around mid-2014, there is increasingly more volatil-
ity in the treatment eects for all outcome variables. However, the results are insignicant and
hardly moving in the expected positive direction. Together with unreported but similarly robust
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Figure 5: Demand channel
Note: Panel (A) depicts regional GDP growth rates across Russian oblasts in 2015, with darker colors
representing higher economic growth; Panel (B) plots the estimated δt coecients of equation 5 with
95% condence intervals around them. Results for two distinct outcome variables are displayed over
time: the log median regional quality (black), and the log mean regional quality (grey). Time is
measured on a monthly basis.
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evidence suggesting no dierential eects on total regional sales, this leads us to conclude that
income shocks across Russian regions had a marginal role in the observed compositional shifts
in the aordable fashion industry and that endogenous amplication channels on the rm-side
must be driving most of the quality downgrading.
3.4 Price pass-through
Having documented quality downgrading in the previous section, in this section we ask why
downgrading occurs. If the rm is stocking fewer high-quality goods, then they must have be-
come relatively less protable; since prot is simply markup multiplied by quantity sold, either
high quality markups, quantities, or both must have experienced a relative decline after the shock.
A dierential reduction in markups would imply lower pass-through of the shock into high
than low quality goods. We run pass-through regressions to determine whether high quality
goods experienced a change in relative prices. Since we do not observe most SKUs for longer than
one season, our main results are not within SKU; rather, we treat a material-brand-group choice
as a consistent product over time through the inclusion of eponymous xed eects. Meanwhile,
we still use SKUs as our unit of observation in the regression. Our specication is:
log(yjmbgt) = β1 log(ERt−1) + β2 log(ERt−1) ·Natjmbgt + β3 log(ERt−1) ·Rusjmbgt (6)
+
∑
bgr
αbgrDbgr +
∑
mbg
αmbgDmbg + jmbgt
where yjmbgt is either pjmbgt, the rst observed price of SKU j of materialm for brand b in product
group g in season t, or cjmbgt, the constant (within season) wholesale cost of j. ERt−1 is the lagged
average U.S. dollar to ruble exchange rate, and Natjmbgt and Rusjmbgt are dummies for whether
SKU j has a natural fabric and Russian origin, respectively. The specication only uses within
material-brand-group variation in prices to identify pass-through.
Results from the regression are presented in Table 5. Pass-through into prices in column
(1) is incomplete, as the coecient on the lagged exchange rate for pass-through into prices is
roughly 0.6 and statistically dierent from 1. However, using the raw data on wholesale costs, this
imperfect pass-through does not correspond to lowered markups: the pass-through on cost is very
similar in column (2).32 Importantly, the dierential change in prices and wholesale costs for high
32From discussions with the rm’s operations sta, they describe negotiating a “50-50” split of the cost increase
(in rubles) with their wholesale suppliers. The coecient on the lagged exchange rate in column (2) is higher than
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Table 5: Pass-through coecients
Dependent variable:
log(price) log(cog)
(1) (2)
log(ERt−1) 0.646∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.037)
log(ERt−1) ·Nat 0.055 0.010
(0.029) (0.035)
log(ERt−1) ·Rus -0.176∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.049)
Brand × Origin FE X X
Brand × Quality FE X X
Observations 417,855 393,916
R2 0.881 0.875
Note: This table presents coecient estimates from specication 6 at the brand-group-fabric level.
The dependent variable is either (1) the rst observed price of SKU j or (2) the within season wholesale
cost of j. ERt−1 is the lagged averaged U.S. dollar to ruble exchange rate, and Nat and Rus are
indicators for whether SKU j has a natural fabric and is of Russian origin, respectively. Standard
errors (in brackets) are clustered at product group×material level to allow within-group-material
serial correlation across time. ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
quality goods is not signicantly dierent from zero, implying no dierential pass-through for
these products. While strategic complementarities in price setting can explain some of the price
increases among Russian-sourced products following the devaluation, those goods still exhibit
signicantly lower pass-through than imported items, validating their use in the previous section
as a control group that is less exposed to the cost shock.
We address concerns that within material-brand-group selection on low-performing SKUs
may be biasing pass-through in Appendix B.3. We also perform standard within-SKU pass-
through regressions on the small set of SKUs we observe for longer than one season, and nd no
evidence of dierential pass-through for natural fabric products.
Even with no dierential pass-through there may have been a dierential reduction in de-
mand. With demand that exhibits expenditure switching, a proportionate price increase can im-
ply a disproportionate reduction in quantity sold of the more expensive, higher quality product.
Indeed, we nd that within product groups, the aggregate quantity sold of high quality products
decreases disproportionately more relative to low quality products. Those results are reported in
Appendix B.3.
0.5, which may reect that larger brands with more SKUs negotiated higher pass-through into costs.
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4 Structural Model
This section develops and estimates a simple structural model of quality choice. We write a model
capable of matching the facts that high quality products are dropped at a faster rate post shock
and that demand decreased for these products disproportionately while there was no dierential
pass-through. The estimated model is then used to assess counterfactuals and the partial welfare
implications of quality downgrading.
4.1 Setup
Demand
Each season t there are Mt consumers indexed by i, who choose among products oered during
that season and an outside option. They face Nht high quality products and N`t low quality
products, each of which is dierentiated with a consumer-product specic idiosyncratic demand
shock. Consumer i’s utility from consuming product j of quality m at time t is given by:
Uijmt = qm + αpjmt + ijmt,
where qm is the vertical quality shifter and ijmt is the idiosyncratic portion of utility.33 We
normalize the utility from the outside good to 0 so Ui0t = i0t, and require that ijmt takes the
logit form. With a slight abuse of notation on Nm, the market share of product j of quality m is:
sjmt(pjmt,p−jt, Nht, N`t) =
exp(qm + αpjmt)
1 +
∑
j′∈Nht exp(qh + αpj′t) +
∑
j′∈N`t exp(q` + αPj′t)
(7)
denoting the set of available products at time t by Jt.
We highlight a key feature of the demand system in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. A proportional increase in both the price of high quality and low quality products, ph
and p`, will lead to a decrease in sjht/sj`t as long as pjht > pj`t.
If prices increase proportionately, then the more expensive product will experience a greater
reduction in market share, as relatively more weight shifts to the outside option. This exactly
33We follow Medina (2018), Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2011) and Alessandria and Kaboski (2011) and our
reduced form in treating quality as a 0-1 dummy corresponding to material. In their analysis of the 2008 income
shock, Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2011) nd more evidence of a quality response when using explicit, 0-1 measures
of quality instead of demand residuals as in Khandelwal (2010).
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mirrors the disproportionate substitution away from expensive, high quality goods in Fajgelbaum,
Grossman, and Helpman (2011).
Quality choice
We assume that each season, purchase managers for each possible individual SKU decide whether
to include that SKU in next season’s oerings. The manager can decide whether or not she wants
the SKU to be a high quality or low quality fabric. The managers take the optimal sourcing
strategies of the other purchase managers into account, but otherwise act independently.34
Formally, the purchase manager for SKU j makes an entry and quality decision at time t− 1,
then chooses pricing depending on the competitive environment at time t after entry decisions
have been realized. We solve managers’ optimal strategies backwards, rst taking as given the
competitive environment and solving prices, then solving the optimal entry.
Conditional on the choices of other managers, a manager will strategically set prices to max-
imize prots in a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium:
p∗jmt = arg max
pjmt
Mt · sjmt(pjmt,p−jt, Nh, N`) · (pjmt − cm · ERt−1)
An SKU j’s base marginal cost cm is in units of foreign currency and is converted to rubles
through ERt−1. From the reduced form section, the rm negotiates prices and chooses stocks
one season in advance, so the eect of the shock will be lagged due to inventory considerations as
in Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010). We choose a symmetric equilibrium in the pricing
game where any j with quality m has the same optimal price p∗mt.
At time t− 1, the manager for j must decide what quality, if any, to source. The prot to j of
providing quality m is:
pijmt = β · pivm(a−jt, ERt−1,Mt, N¯)− fm − σjmt
where a−jt denotes the equilibrium entry and quality strategies of all potential entrants, of which
34Models of product sourcing with production or demand interrelationships fall into the class of combinatorial
optimization problems (Antras, Fort, and Tintelnot, 2017). Our model requires demand interrelationships be taken
into account, since inward shifting residual demand curves are the only limit on the size of the rm; we thus cannot
use the quality sourcing models of Fan, Li, and Yeaple (2018) or Manova and Yu (2017), which rely on single product
rms or abstract from interrelationships. Our method implies a tractable sourcing model that is very easy to solve
and estimate (< 1 sec to compute an equilibrium, vs. roughly 1 day for Jia (2008)).
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there are N¯ , which together determine the total number of SKUs of each type that j will compete
against at time t. Note that while most subscripts are kept as t to denote that payo and pricing is
realized at time t, entry decisions are made and xed costs incurred at time t− 1, so that variable
prot is discounted by β. The scale of variable prots are xed in rubles, so we allow the scale of
the variance of jmt to adjust.
Note that jmt is an idiosyncratic information shock that is only observed by j. Managers
know the distributionG and form beliefs about other managers’ behavior. In particular, manager
k expects that j will choose quality m with probability Pjmt, and will choose not to enter with
probability Pj0t. Manager j’s expected prots from choosing material m are then:
piejmt(P−jt)− σjmt,
where the expectation is taken over all the possible distributions of oered product qualities given
strategies P−jt. Since −jt is not observed by j, this is an incomplete information game of entry
and quality choice similar to Seim (2006), Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2006) and Ershov
(2018).
Assuming that jmt takes the EV Type 1 distribution, j’s probability of choosing quality m is:
Pjmt =
exp(piejmt(P−jt)/σ)
1 +
∑
m′ exp(pi
e
jm′t(P−jt)/σ)
(8)
A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) at each time t is a vector of choice probabilities Pt that
solves equation 8 so that equilibrium actions are consistent with equilibrium beliefs.
Welfare
Consumer welfare in the model takes the standard logit form. We multiply by market size and
divide through by the price coecient to express welfare in rubles:
Wt = Mt
1
|α| log
(
1 +
∑
j∈Jt
exp(αpjt + qj)
)
Our welfare formula will serve as a useful internal benchmark when we evaluate the conse-
quences of counterfactual devaluations or policies. Since the formula only covers one rm, we
do not claim that it represents the full welfare costs of the devaluation.
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4.2 Model predictions
We provide intuition for the model’s predictions for how a manager’s choice of products changes
in response to a nominal exchange rate devaluation with the following theorem:
Theorem 1. There exist parameters such that for a given exchange rate, pih > pi`, but (1) a man-
ager’s elasticity of choosing h with respect to the exchange rate is larger than the elasticity for `, and
(2) the exchange-rate elasticity of demand is larger for h than for `.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The theorem states that it is possible for a high quality good to be more protable than a
low quality one, but still be dropped at a faster rate in response to an exchange rate shock. This
result comes from the demand model, and would also be generated by the non-homothetic linear
demand curves of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) or Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik, and Neary (2015).
Both the logit and linear demand can predict disproportionate substitution from a high price,
high quality good to the outside option in response to a proportional cost shock aecting all inside
goods. The result does not require that markups for the high quality good drop more quickly, but
does require that the elasticity of demand for the high quality good is larger, and that consumers
actually shift expenditures away from the high quality good as in Bems and di Giovanni (2016).
In Appendix C we show that if the expenditure share across h and ` goods remains xed, then
even if the elasticity of substitution is higher for h goods than ` goods in a CES framework, there
will still not be a disproportionate reduction in h oerings.
5 Estimation and Results
This section describes how the model is estimated using the subset of product (or “target”) groups
for which quality is costly to provide in the sense of Figure 4.35 We estimate the parameters as a
function of the data in three steps: rst, demand parameters are estimated; second, the demand
system is inverted to recover marginal costs; third, the entry and exit model uses demand and
cost parameter estimates combined with equilibrium rm strategies to back out xed costs and
the variance of the prot shock.
35The six exluded product groups are Jeans, Sweatshirts, Tee-shirts and Polos, Trousers and Jumpsuits, Underwear,
and Vests and Tops.
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5.1 Method
5.1.1 Demand model
The model provides an analytic representation of the share of a particular product in equation 7.
Taking the log dierence between the season sales share of any given product sold that season
and the share of the outside option yields:
ln(sjmt)− ln(s0t) = qjm + αpjt (9)
Our data reports quantities, which we transform into shares by making an assumption on the
market size. Unique to our online data, in each season we observe the total number of units
individuals considered buying but did not—i.e., their shopping carts—which we take as the market
size.36 The relationship between market size and total quantity ordered is provided in Figure C.3
in Appendix C.
In practice, to estimate equation 9 requires the addition of an error term. If the error term is
a demand shock observed by the rm, then the OLS coecient α in equation 9 will be positively
biased. We experiment with dierent estimation strategies and use monthly price and quantity
variation to recover αˆ independently of quality shifters; details are provided in Appendix C. We
then dierence out αˆ and estimate:
ln(sjmt)− ln(s0t)− αˆpjt = βq0 + βq11[m(j) = h] + νqj (10)
These coecients translate into the structural parameters as q` = βˆq0 and qh = βˆ
q
0 + βˆ
q
1 .
5.1.2 Costs
We use observed prices and the assumption of Bertrand-Nash competitive price setting to back
out baseline marginal costs. In particular, prot maximization implies that:
cjt = pjt − 1
α(1− sjt)
36This is one way to determine market size in e-commerce industries, and it is especially useful for the largest
retailers—as our rm—that are well-known to most of their potential customers. One underlying interpretation is
that consumers resort to other stores to obtain the remainder of their initial shopping cart selection.
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We use αˆ and observed season-level prices and shares to recover cˆjt. To recover the baseline
marginal cost we assume cjt = cmER
βc2
t−1, which delivers the estimating equation:
log(cjt) = β
c
0 + β
c
11[m(j) = h] + β
c
2 log(ERt−1) + ν
c
jt,
ERt−1 is the mean U.S. dollar to ruble exchange rate in Table 2 lagged one season and normalized
by the long run average.37 Normalization implies that ch = exp(βˆc0 + βˆc1) and c` = exp(βˆc0) are
estimated in rubles.
5.1.3 Entry model
The only parameters remaining are the xed costs of stocking a high cost and low cost good,
fh and f`, and the xed cost shock variance σ. However, to give the model more degrees of
freedom to match how products are added and dropped in response to exchange rate uctuations,
we introduce a scaling parameter φ that multiplies ch. That is, c˜h = φch. We also introduce a
xed cost f`,w for low cost goods during the winter to account for time-of-year uctuations in
the data.
The entry model is thus parametrized by θs ≡ {φ, fh, f`, f`,w}. For estimation we maximize
the log likelihood function:
L(W, θs) =
∑
t
∑
m
∑
j
log (Pjmt(θ
s)) (11)
To construct entry probabilities as a function of parameters, we rst non-parametrically estimate
the probabilities as a function of data only as in Medina (2018). We assume N¯ is 1.2 times the
maximum number of observed SKUs in a season to convert raw entry numbers into probabilities
of entry. Using those probabilities as estimates of managers’ equilibrium beliefs, we then solve for
managers’ expected prots and optimal strategies as a function of parameters.38 This estimation
strategy bypasses the diculties created by multiple equilibria—which is an issue in our entry
game with multiple qualities—as long as we assume only one equilibrium is played in the data,
which is standard (Hotz and Miller, 1993).
37To normalize the exchange rate, we divide by the expected value of the AR(1) run on season-level data from
2000-2014.
38We simplify the computation of managers’ expected entry prots slightly by ignoring Jensen’s inequality; see
Appendix C.3 for details.
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5.1.4 Identication
Identifying the parameters in the demand and cost regressions is straightforward. For the entry
model, the xed costs will be identied by the average probability of entry for each quality of good
and the average protability of each quality. For instance, if the prot of high quality goods is
larger on average but the probability of entry is lower, the model will rationalize this feature with
a higher xed cost for high quality goods. Assuming a higher number of potential entrants will
lead to a lower probability of entry for each type of product, but will not change the proportions
or prot, which will simply lead to higher xed costs.
Identication of φ will depend on whether the baseline ch and qh in the data can match the
reallocation towards low quality in the March 2015 season of the data. If relatively fewer high
quality goods enter after periods of low ruble valuations in the data, then φ will increase only if
the baseline cost bump ch − c` is not sucient to induce the reallocation.
5.2 Results
Results from each stage of the estimation are gathered and presented in Table 6.
The price parameter α implies that average p/c ≈ 3, which is in the neighborhood of the
median of rst-period price divided by wholesale cost of 2.4.39 Overestimating margins will lead
to an overestimation of xed costs to rationalize lower participation, but would not increase the
protability of high versus low quality goods.
The demand shifter for high quality goods βˆq1 is positive, as is the cost shifter βˆc1, giving us
that quality is valuable to consumers and expensive for the rm to provide. All else equal, natural
fabric goods are expected to sell 12.4% more than articial fabrics goods, while high cost goods
cost 82% more.40 Pass-through from the lagged exchange rate into marginal costs is 0.70, which
is similar to the coecient recovered from the reduced form regression in Table 5.
The xed costs are estimated in hundreds of thousands of rubles. At the pre-2014 long run
stationary average of 30.75 rubles per U.S. dollar, this implies sourcing costs of $3,400 and $5,800
for high and low cost goods, respectively. While at rst glance it may seem surprising that high
quality goods have a lower xed cost, one should keep in mind that these are sourcing costs and
not development costs as in other work (Medina, 2018; Ershov, 2018). In their paper on import
39The elasticity may be underestimated due to standard price endogeneity, or because we do not fully capture
dynamic demand eects with our months-since-entry dummies.
40The cost shifter is multiplied by the scaling parameter, exp(φ · βc1) = 82%.
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Table 6: Structural parameter estimates
Type Parameter Estimate SE
Demand α -0.32 0.01
βq0 -10.06
βq1 0.12 0.02
Marginal Cost βc0 6.80
βc1 0.04 0.01
βc2 0.70 0.01
Entry and Exit fh 1.03 0.01
f` 1.78 0.01
f`,w 0.11 0.01
σ 0.65 0.004
φ 13.94 0.21
Note: This table presents estimation results.
sourcing, Antras, Fort, and Tintelnot (2017) estimate that xed costs tend to be higher for U.S.
rms sourcing from low income countries such as China and India—which typically manufacture
lower quality inputs—compared to high income countries such as Norway and Germany, which
manufacture higher quality inputs.
The model does well in matching the entry and exit data: the correlation between the pre-
dicted probabilities of entering as a high quality rm and the data is 0.93, and the corresponding
correlation for low quality rms is 0.95. The correlation between the ratio of these predicted
probabilities and the ratio of the probabilities in the data is 0.75. A full plot of model predictions
versus data is provided in Figure C.4 in Appendix C.
Importantly, the model is able to match quality downgrading and a disproportionate drop in
the protability of high quality products. Figure 6 shows that with the estimated model param-
eters, high quality product prots decrease disproportionately quickly compared to low quality
prots in response to the devaluation. In turn, there is disproportionate exit of high quality prod-
ucts, and indeed with these parameters low quality products will actually enter over some ranges
of the devaluation due to the general equilibrium eect of reduced competition.
5.3 Quality downgrading and price pass-through
To what extent does quality downgrading aect exchange rate pass-through into average prices?
The literature typically focuses on pass-through within narrow categories (Knetter, 1989) or
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Figure 6: Predicted eects of a devaluation
Note: Prots are expected prots, since the xed cost of sourcing is stochastic. Prots decrease dis-
proportionately quickly in response to a devaluation for high quality products, leading to their dis-
proportionate exit.
within products (Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2010a). Our product groups are similar to HS-6 or in
some cases HS-10 categories, and Theorem 1 shows that the model supports quality downgrad-
ing within products, so our pass-through results can easily be applied to those literatures. Our
model is estimated and aggregated across all groups to highlight that the mechanism does not
rely on any cross-group heterogeneity, and to provide an easy-to-interpret eect magnitude.
We present average predicted prices in Fall 2014 (pre-shock) and Winter 2015 (post-shock)
when quality reallocation is allowed and compare them to prices when the number of products
is kept constant at Fall 2014 levels. In Fall 2014, the normalized exchange rate rose from 1.15
to 1.67, a 45% increase. Using the structural marginal cost pass-through coecient βˆc2 = 0.7
estimated in Section 5.2, this implies a 32% proportional increase in marginal costs for high and
low quality products. From Table 5 in Section 3.4, the 45% exchange rate increase would imply a
45%× 0.64 = 28.8% increase in prices within-product.
To solve the equilibrium entry probabilities we use a nested xed point approach as in Seim
(2006).41 The average price is computed as (Nˆhtsˆhtpˆht + Nˆ`tsˆ`tpˆ`t)/(Nˆhtsˆht + Nˆ`tsˆ`t), where hats
indicate predicted values from the model.
41For the base model counterfactuals, to nd optimal entry probabilities we try a range of starting values centered
around the empirical probabilities of entry for the Fall/Winter 2014 period and nd no evidence of multiple equilibria.
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Table 7: Average price pass-through
Average Price (RUB)
Model Fall 2014 Spring 2015 ∆%
Quality Reallocation 4,575.8 5,021.4 9.7
No Reallocation 4,575.8 5,051.5 10.4
Note: This table presents average pass-through with and without quality adjustments.
The results in Table 7 indicate that quality reallocation plays a role in dampening average
price increases, implying a 9.7% increase instead of 10.4% in the model with no reallocation, 0.7
percentage points or roughly 6% lower.42
Any manager may also choose to replace a high quality product with a low quality one,
depending on xed cost draws, as high quality goods become relatively less protable. While
we cannot directly test this scenario in the data as we do not observe when a good is directly
replaced—only the aggregate product choices each season—replacement is supported by our
model, and others have found evidence of frequent product replacement in the microdata (Naka-
mura and Steinsson, 2012). The Fall 2014 price of a high low quality good is 4,890 RUB, while the
Spring 2015 price of a low quality good is 4,409 RUB. For high quality products that are replaced,
our model thus predicts pass-through of −9.8%.
5.4 Welfare counterfactuals
The model allows us to answer the question of how welfare would change if the rm could not
downgrade quality in response to a devaluation, a scenario we do not see in the data. This coun-
terfactual is applicable where there are technological constraints on downgrading, such that only
high quality materials are sucient—for instance, with extreme cold weather gear—or when there
are regulations that mandate inputs must be a certain quality for particular products.
We evaluate the change in welfare that would result if the xed cost of sourcing a low-quality
good was prohibitive, so that managers choose between a high-quality good and not entering.
Practically, we rst assume that the xed cost of sourcing a low quality good increases by a factor
of 10, then simulate the equilibrium probability of entry and the resulting prices pre and post cost
shock, and nally compute the ratio of consumer welfare pre (W ) and post (W ′).43
42The marginal cost is roughly one-third of price and markups in the logit model are additive, so the price pass-
through is roughly one-third that predicted in the reduced form.
43This exercise is similar to that in Medina (2018) where the author prohibits quality upgrading by increasing the
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Table 8: Counterfactuals
Model ∆Ph ∆P` ∆Pentry W ′/W
Prices Only 0.869
Base -0.042 0.006 -0.037 0.835
No downgrading -0.051 -0.051 0.780
Note: This table presents counterfactual simulation results. ∆Ph and ∆P` are the probabilities of
entering as a high- and low-quality product, respectively. W ′/W is the welfare change in each case.
Our counterfactual predictions are evaluated using the same Fall 2014 depreciation as used in
the previous section. The results are presented in Table 8.
In the base model, there is a 4.2 percentage point decrease in the probability of entering as a
high quality product, and a 0.6 percentage point increase in the probability of entering as a low
quality product. The baseline probabilities of entry pre-shock are 47.6% and 26.0%, respectively, so
the loss of high quality products is substantial. The entry of low quality products comes through
general equilibrium eects: despite the increase in costs, the reduction in competition due to
fewer high quality products makes it slightly more protable to enter as a low quality product
on balance. We expect that for larger devaluations, the unconditional probability of low quality
entry would also decrease; however, the relative probability of high to low quality entry would
still decrease.
Welfare changes computed using the base model show that faced with the devaluation ex-
perienced in September 2014, consumer surplus decreases in the following season by roughly
16.5%. The model that does not allow quality downgrading would predict a 22.0% decline, a 5.5
percentage point (33%) dierence compared to the base case, and a model that prevents rm exit
would predict only a 13.1% decline in welfare. Adding an entry/exit margin increases the welfare
loss, but oering rms the exibility to quality downgrade instead of exiting dampens the welfare
cost to consumers.
Quality’s role in the welfare costs of a devaluation
We are interested in whether eliminating—or increasing—the demand shifter for high quality
goods will change the welfare costs of a devaluation. Eliminating the shifter corresponds to a
more standard trade model, where costs are the only dimension of product heterogeneity, while
xed costs of sourcing.
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Note: This gure plots the welfare cost of the devaluation for dierent values of the quality demand
shifter, holding all other estimated parameters xed. An x-axis value of one corresponds to no demand
increase for high cost goods, i.e., a model with only cost heterogeneity.
increasing the shifter provides insights on industries for which quality is indeed more valued. We
simulate equilibrium entry and pricing pre and post cost shock for dierent values of the quality
demand shifter, holding other parameters xed, and using the same depreciation as for Table 8.
We then compute the ratio of consumer welfare pre (W ) and post (W ′) shock for each value of
the demand shifter and plot the results in Figure 7.
A model with no quality heterogeneity will underpredict the true welfare costs of the nominal
devaluation (as reported in the rst row of Table 8 and highlighted in Figure 7). For our estimated
parameters the error is slight; the baseline model with its relatively small demand shifter only
predicts a 0.2 percentage point greater reduction in welfare compared to the model with no quality
heterogeneity. For a demand shifter equal in magnitude to the cost shifter the welfare reduction
would be 0.7pp greater.44
Interestingly, the eect of increasing the demand shifter from 0 (where the sales ratio of
high/low quality is 1, all else equal) on the welfare cost of the devaluation is nonmonotonic.
The U-shape is the result of two countervailing forces: as the benet of quality increases, it be-
44Using a demand shifter of βˆc1 × φˆ. For a high quality/low quality cost ratio of 2.7, the maximum in Table 4, we
plot the welfare loss as a function of the quality shifter in Appendix C and show it can be up to 1.5pp larger.
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comes less likely that a product will be dropped in response to the devaluation because quality
will have a buering eect on prots; however, for those goods that are dropped, the welfare cost
to consumers of losing those products is increased. For our parameters, as the shifter increases
from zero, quality products continue to be dropped at a fast rate in response to the devaluation,
and the increased quality of the goods being dropped makes consumers worse o overall. Even-
tually, the buering eect of quality takes over and the decrease in the drop rate counterbalances
the increased welfare loss from dropping.
In general, the counterfactual suggests that a model with only cost heterogeneity may either
overstate or understate the welfare loss from a devaluation, depending on the relative strength
of the two eects of quality at the estimated parameters. Signing the bias from omitting quality
during devaluations or tari shocks may, therefore, not be possible ex ante.
6 Conclusion
We use a novel and unique online retail dataset that spans Russia’s enormous currency depreci-
ation in late 2014 as an innately suitable laboratory to dissect how rms respond to cost shocks.
We document that changes to product quality gure prominently in the micro-transmission fol-
lowing exchange rate shocks. The data shows that there is a reallocation toward relatively low
quality goods in response to the ruble devaluation and that an increase in rm costs, not a re-
duction in income, is the primary driver of this quality downgrading. Our paper complements a
long literature on incomplete exchange rate pass through by showing direct evidence of another
margin of adjustment for rms, and introduces an endogenous rm reallocation margin to the
literature on expenditure switching in demand systems. Using a simple structural model of mul-
tiproduct sourcing, the paper shows how allowing goods to be heterogeneous in both quality and
cost, and letting rms quality downgrade, oers more nuanced predictions of the welfare eect
of a devaluation.
Our study looks at the eects of the exchange rate shock on quality holding consumer pref-
erences xed. Yet reductions in quality may deplete rms’ relationship capital with consumers,
leading to larger long-run demand elasticities and less reallocation; conversely, consumers’ tastes
may adapt to the suddenly more-prevalent low quality goods, implying further future realloca-
tion. We leave those questions regarding the long-run demand consequences of adjusting quality
in response to cost shocks for future research.
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A Data
Table A.1: Material quality mapping
Material High Quality Num. SKUs Blend Fraction
Cotton 1 140,665 0.508
Polyester 0 104,400 0.653
Leather 1 71,173 0.057
Elastane 1 51,757 0.999
Viscose 1 42,806 0.774
Nylon 1 31,613 0.814
Articial Leather 0 28,637 0.062
Polymer 0 27,614 0.323
Textile 1 17,618 0.334
Acrylic 0 17,480 0.657
Wool 1 17,411 0.842
Suede 1 10,344 0.028
Spandex 1 8,089 1
Nubuck 1 4,776 0.004
Velour 1 4,046 0.0002
Silk 1 4,024 0.450
Articial 0 3,256 0.233
Lycra 1 2,751 0.998
Linen 1 2,745 0.765
Rubber 1 2,729 0.715
Angora 1 2,111 0.998
Modal 1 1,924 0.866
Articial Suede 0 1,900 0.001
Cashmere 1 1,678 0.931
Split 1 1,511 0.001
Articial Nubuck 0 933 0.002
District 1 852 0.826
Mohair 1 767 0.982
Acetate 0 676 0.934
Note: This table presents the mapping from the 30 most commonly occurring fabrics, 97% of SKUs
and accounting for all materials in 93% of SKUs, into the high/low quality dummy.
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Figure A.1: Month of rst appearance for new SKUs by season
Note: This gure shows histograms of the distribution of Fall and Spring introductions by month.
The gray area covers the months we choose to associate with Spring goods of March-August.
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Figure A.2: Overlapping generations of goods
Note: This gure plots the revenue shares (between 0 and 1) for each generation of goods over subse-
quent Fall and Spring seasons.
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B Reduced Form Evidence
B.1 Prot and quality
We run the following regression on the entire set of pre-shock products (Fall 2014 and earlier)
and report the results in Table B.1:
log(yjbgt) = β ·Naturalj +
∑
bg
αbgDbg +
∑
t
αtDt + jbgt (B.1)
where yjbgt is either the prot, quantity sold, or price of SKU j, in product group g, in season t,
Dbg and Dt are brand×product group and season xed eects, respectively. Standard errors are
clustered at the brand×product group level to allow for serial correlation across time. The results
are similar to before: high quality goods are signicantly about 4.4% more protable, and sell at
a 5.2% higher price on average.
Table B.1: Mean dierences for high quality products
Dependent variable:
log(pi) log(q) log(p)
(1) (2) (3)
Naturalj 0.044∗∗∗ -0.007 0.052∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Brand × Group FE X X X
Season FE X X X
Observations 305,376 305,376 305,376
R2 0.624 0.592 0.881
Note: This table presents coecient estimates from specication B.1. The outcome variables is either
the prot, quantity sold, or price of SKU j, in product group g, in season t. Product group and season
xed eects are included. Prices are sales-weighted within SKUs, and standard errors are clustered
at the brand×group level. ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
B.2 Quality downgrading
Number of SKU quality downgrading regressions
In this section we run regressions to assess quality downgrading using the logged raw number
of SKUs as a dependent variable, instead of the high quality share of SKUs. Regressions in this
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section are at the season and product group level.
The rst regression drops Russian produced goods, and does a DiD analysis using the natural
material category as a treatment group. Let m index quality, with m = 1 indicating high quality
and m = 0 low quality. Using only imported products and taking the log number of high or low
quality SKUs as the dependent variable, we run the following specication:
log(Nmgt) = δ (naturalmg · log(ERt−1)) +
∑
mg
αmgDmg +
∑
gt
αgtDgt + mgt, (B.2)
Table B.2: Heterogeneous downgrading coecients
Group Cost Ratio Coef. SE p-val
Ankle Boots 2.571 -1.404 0.152 0
Bags 2.155 0.409 0.204 0.045
Ballerina Shoes 2.296 -1.065 0.430 0.013
Blazers And Suits 1.235 0.153 0.076 0.044
Boots 2.057 -0.383 0.171 0.025
Dresses 1.218 -0.258 0.063 0.00004
Flip Flops 1.833 -0.395 0.084 0.00000
Headwear 1.090 0.139 0.276 0.614
Heeled Sandals 2.250 -1.068 0.209 0.00000
High Boots 2.567 -1.114 0.309 0.0003
Jeans 0.639 -0.056 0.024 0.018
Knitwear 1.034 -0.120 0.057 0.036
Moccasins 2.628 -0.427 0.073 0
Outwear 1.293 -0.625 0.224 0.005
Sandals 2.203 -0.800 0.317 0.012
Scarves 1.599 -0.659 1.090 0.546
Shirts 1.301 -0.145 0.117 0.212
Shoes 2.519 -1.038 0.264 0.0001
Shorts 1.336 0.241 0.225 0.285
Skirts 1.034 -0.116 0.194 0.551
Sport Shoes 1.289 -0.609 0.413 0.140
Sweatshirts 0.993 -0.019 0.068 0.778
Tee-Shirts And Polos 0.945 0.537 0.066 0
Trousers And Jumpsuits 0.871 -0.130 0.054 0.017
Underwear 0.538 -0.051 0.050 0.302
Vests And Tops 0.882 -0.150 0.072 0.036
Note: This table presents estimated quality downgrading coecients across various product categories
along with their levels of statistical signicance.
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Figure B.1: Polymer presence by manufacturing origin
Note: This gure shows the fraction of SKUs where “polymer” is listed as a component over time by
domestic (red dashed line) and imported (blue solid line) goods.
where naturalmg is a dummy equal to 1 for high quality products in group g. If relatively more
low quality goods than high quality goods were introduced after the cost shock, then δ should
be estimated negative, and the quality downgrading nding in the main paper should not be the
result of quality upgrading in the control group.
The second regression keeps Russian produced goods and is therefore a triple-dierence spec-
ication, with natural, imported goods as the treatment group:
log(Nmgrt) = δ (naturalmg · nonrusgr · log(ERt−1)) +
∑
mgr
αmgrDmgr (B.3)
+
∑
mgt
αmgtDmgt +
∑
grt
αgrtDgrt + mgrt
This is a triple dierence regression: compared to the dierential movement of Russian high
quality goods relative to Russian low quality goods, δ will be negative if the decrease in imported
high quality goods relative to low quality goods is lower than for Russian goods. The estimation
results are reported in Table B.5. We nd that both prediction are borne out in the data and thus
lend additional support to the cost shock generated quality downgrading mechanism.
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Table B.3: Dierential quality downgrading robustness: logged dependent variable
Dependent variable:
log(natfracgrt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nonrusgr · log(ERt−1) -0.360∗∗ -0.662∗∗∗ -0.595∗∗ 0.095
(0.072) (0.133) (0.212) (1.909)
Origin FE X
Season FE X X
Group × Origin FE X X
Group × Season FE X
Brand × Origin FE X
Observations 16 393 393 22,945
R2 0.915 0.647 0.853 0.999
Note: This table presents coecient estimates from specication 3, but with a logged dependent
variable, aggregating SKUs within non-Russian (imported) or Russian origin in column (1), within
product group-origin in columns (2) and (3), and within brand-origin in column (4). The outcome
is the fraction of oered SKUs that use a natural fabric for group or brand g, origin r, in season t.
nonrusgr is an indicator with a value of one for the set of non-Russian products in group or brand
g, and log(ERt−1) is the average exchange rate during season t − 1. Standard errors (in brackets)
are clustered at product group or brand×origin level to allow for serial correlation across time. ***,
**, * indicate signicance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
B.3 Price pass-through and quantity switching
Dierential pass-through dispersion
A concern with the main price pass-through regressions is that since we are not measuring price
changes within SKUs, but within material-brand-groups, there may be dierential selection of
products after the exchange rate shock in a way that biases the results. For instance, if there
are dierent types of high quality products for a particular brand, and if some of them reduce
markups more in response to the devaluation, it stands to reason that those high quality goods
would drop out by more as they become less protable. Our regression would thus nd more
pass-through for high quality goods than there should be.
We evaluate the role within-brand-material SKU heterogeneity plays by checking the second
moments of the price and wholesale cost distributions for high and low quality goods. Suppose
demand is such that a brand’s least expensive high quality goods have more scope for incomplete
pass-through compared to its other high quality goods; if the markup contraction makes these
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Table B.4: Dierential quality downgrading robustness: dropped nal season
Dependent variable:
natfracgrt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nonrusgr · log(ERt−1) -0.237∗ -0.355∗∗∗ -0.348∗ 0.244
(0.088) (0.074) (0.156) (1.254)
Origin FE X
Season FE X X
Group × Origin FE X X
Group × Season FE X
Brand × Origin FE X
Observations 14 347 347 23,423
R2 0.858 0.695 0.864 0.999
Note: This table presents coecient estimates from specication 3, but dropping the last season (2015-
09), aggregating SKUs within non-Russian (imported) or Russian origin in column (1), within product
group-origin in columns (2) and (3), and within brand-origin in column (4). The outcome is the
fraction of oered SKUs that use a natural fabric for group or brand g, origin r, in season t. nonrusgr
is an indicator with a value of one for the set of non-Russian products in group or brand g, and
log(ERt−1) is the average exchange rate during season t − 1. Standard errors (in brackets) are
clustered at product group or brand×origin level to allow for serial correlation across time. ***, **, *
indicate signicance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
goods unprotable to stock after the cost shock, then the coecient of variation for a brand’s
high quality goods’ prices (σp/µp) should decrease, as lower priced SKUs from the bottom of
the brand’s price distribution of high quality SKUs drop out. The coecient of variation for
a brand’s high quality goods’ prices would also decrease if it is a brand’s most expensive high
quality goods that have more scope for incomplete pass-through. If the coecient of variation
for a brand’s high quality goods prices does not decrease after the cost shock, then even if there
is heterogeneity in pass-through within-brand-material it will not bias the average pass-through
regressions through selection.
We run the following specication at the material-brand-season level to check for dierential
reductions in price and cost dispersion of a brand’s high quality SKUs:
CVxmbgt = β1 log(ERt−1) + β2 log(ERt−1) ·Natmbgt + log(ERt−1) ·Rusmbgt (B.4)
+
∑
bgr
αbgrDbgr +
∑
mbg
αmbgDmbg + mbgt,
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Table B.5: Number of SKUs quality downgrading results
Dependent variable:
log(Nmgrt)
(1) (2)
log(ERt−1) · naturalmg -1.218∗∗∗
(0.271)
log(ERt−1) · naturalmg · nonrusgr -1.109∗∗
(0.412)
Group × Quality FE X
Group × Season FE X
Group × Origin × Quality FE X
Group × Origin × Season FE X
Group × Quality × Season FE X
Observations 416 732
R2 0.983 0.90
Note: The outcome is the log number of high or low quality SKUs. naturalmg is an indicator equal
to 1 for high quality products in group g, nonrusgr is an indicator with a value of one for the set of
non-Russian products in group g, and log(ERt−1) is the average exchange rate during season t− 1.
Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at group×origin level to allow for serial correlation across
time. ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
where β2 6= 0 would indicate a dierential eect of the exchange rate on the coecient of varia-
tion of either the prices or wholesale costs for fabric type m for brand b in season s, and β1 6= 0
indicates a baseline eect of the exchange rate on dispersion, and can be estimated when the
xed eects do not control for season. Results in Table B.6 show no signicance for β2, implying
that the dispersion in prices and costs did not change dierentially for high quality goods. More-
over, β1 itself is not signicantly dierent from zero, suggesting no eect of the cost shock on the
baseline within-brand pricing dispersion. These results suggests that dierential dropping of low
margin, high quality goods in response to the cost shock is not biasing our pass-through results.
Micro-dynamics of price adjustments
Conditioning on price adjustments, the next section shows that within-SKU pass-through is very
high for imported goods. Even though the number of products that live across seasons is small
relative to the overall volume, one can use those observations to ask if natural items experienced
any dierential exchange rate pass-through.
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Table B.6: No change in within-brand-fabric price dispersion
Dependent variable:
CV(p) CV(cog)
(1) (2)
log(ERt−1) -0.006 -0.006
(0.012) (0.013)
log(ERt−1) ·Nat -0.016 -0.012
(0.014) (0.015)
log(ERt−1) ·Rus -0.010∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
Brand × Origin FE X X
Brand × Quality FE X X
Observations 21,533 21,429
R2 0.815 0.772
Note: This table presents coecient estimates from specication B.4 at the fabric-brand-season level.
The dependent variable is either (1) the within brand-fabric coecient of variation of prices or (2)
the same but for wholesale costs. ERt−1 is the lagged averaged U.S. dollar to ruble exchange rate,
and Nat and Rus are indicators for whether SKU j has a natural fabric and is of Russian origin,
respectively. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the brand×origin and brand×quality-
level to allow for serial correlation across time. ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5%
levels, respectively.
At the SKU-level, we estimate pass-through into prices of exchange rate shocks realized dur-
ing the most recent period of price non-adjustment and of those that were realized prior to the
previous price adjustment. As discussed in the literature (Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010a)), in the
absence of real rigidities, all adjustment should take place at the rst instance of price change and
hence the coecient on the exchange rate change prior to the previous price adjustment should
be zero. More precisely, the following regression is estimated:
∆pi,t = β1∆τ1et + β2∆τ2et−τ1 + ηi + i,t (B.5)
where i indexes the SKU, t stands for the date, the outcome variable, ∆pi,t, is the change in the log
ruble price of a good, conditional on price adjustment, and ∆τ1et ≡ et−et−τ1 is the the cumulative
change in the log of the nominal exchange rate over the duration when the previous price was
in eect (denoted as τ1). Analogously, τ2 denotes the duration of the previous price of the rm
so that ∆τ2et−τ1 ≡ et−τ1 − et−τ1−τ2 is the cumulative exchange rate change over the previous
period of non-adjustment, i.e., the period prior to the previous price change. Solely within-SKU
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Table B.7: Within-SKU pass-through
Dependent variable: ∆ log(pi,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆τ1 usdrubi,t 0.993∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗
[0.279] [0.409]
∆τ2 usdrubi,t−τ1 0.649∗∗∗ 0.553
[0.203] [0.410]
∆τ1 usdrubi,t ·Nat 0.894
[0.975]
∆τ2 usdrubi,t−τ1 ·Nat -0.410
[0.923]
∆τ1 eurrubi,t 0.500∗ 0.383
[0.270] [0.383]
∆τ2 eurrubi,t−τ1 0.461∗∗ 0.190
[0.217] [0.437]
∆τ1 eurrubi,t ·Nat 0.948
[0.766]
∆τ2 eurrubi,t−τ1 ·Nat -0.272
[0.935]
SKU FE X X X X
Observations 1,391 1,055 1,391 1,055
No. SKUs 1,126 839 1,126 839
R2 0.028 0.035 0.009 0.023
Note: This table presents pass-through coecient estimates at the rst and second rounds of price
adjustment, respectively, estimated from regression B.5. The outcome variable is the change in the
log ruble price of a good, conditional on price adjustment. All specications include SKU xed eects
and standard errors [in brackets] are clustered at the SKU-level to allow for serial correlation across
time. The estimation results are based on daily observations between Jan 1, 2014 and April 1, 2015.
***, **, * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
variation is exploited via the inclusion of good-specic xed eects, ηi, and standard errors are
clustered at the SKU-level to allow for serial correlation across time.
Table B.7 reports the results from estimations of regression B.5. The number of SKUs is much
smaller than in previous regressions due to the fact that there are very few goods that live across
seasons. Still, the ndings in columns (1) and (3) show that pass-through high after the cost
shock. Compared to the Euro, the estimated coecients are larger and more signicant for the
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U.S. dollar to ruble exchange rate. This is because most trade is invoiced in U.S. dollars rather
than in Euros. Columns (2) and (4) present very similar results, but allowing for exchange rate
pass-through to dier across natural versus non-natural SKUs, which means that the model is
augmented with interaction terms between the exchange rate change and the natural dummy.
None of the multiplicative terms are statistically distinguishable from zero, suggesting yet again
that pass-through does not vary across high quality and low quality goods.
Dierential quantity reduction
We test whether there was a dierential reduction in shares for high quality goods. Using similar
units of observation as for the above pass-through regressions, at the material-group-season level,
we run:
log(qmgt) =
∑
t
δt (Natmg · Dt) +
∑
mg
αmgDmg +
∑
gt
αgtDgt + mgt (B.6)
where qmgt is the aggregate quantity sold of material m, product group g, in season t. We restrict
our sample to imports only. A consumption reallocation away from high quality towards low
quality would be reected in a negative, signicant δt, starting in March 2015. The results are
plotted in Figure B.2 and show a relative reduction in the quantity share of high-quality goods
right after the steep ruble devaluation. We also estimate the regression using expenditures (price
multiplied by quantity sold) as the dependent variable and nd very similar results; since we use
within product group variation this makes our results comparable to the within group switching
in Bems and di Giovanni (2016).
This section highlights that dierential demand responses play a key role in the reallocation
towards lower quality products, as even with no relative change in prices or markups high quality
products disproportionately decrease in quantity purchased. There is also supporting evidence
that the quality downgrading was not completely in response to an income shock, since if that
were true one might expect some reallocation in Figure B.2 towards low quality when the income
shock hit in the Fall 2014 season. The fact that signicant reallocation only occurred after the rm
passed through higher costs into consumer prices suggests that the cost shock played a dominant
role in product quality downgrading.
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Figure B.2: Dierential quantity reduction
Note: This gure plots the estimated δt coecients of equation B.6 with 95% condence intervals
around them. Fixed eects are at the product group×material and product group×season level.
Standard errors are clustered at product group×material level to allow within-group-material serial
correlation. Results are similar when only using a season, instead of group×season xed eect.
B.4 Demand channel robustness
Prices as outcome variables
Regression model 5 is estimated using the median and mean regular prices in region i at time t as
the outcome variables instead. The results are displayed in Figure B.3. Again, the parallel trends
assumption seems to hold. The estimated δˆt are somewhat more volatile but insignicant, and
not moving in the expected positive direction. This suggests that product quality downgrading is
driven by an endogenous amplication channel on the part of the rm rather than by an income-
induced “ight from quality” phenomenon originating from consumers.
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Figure B.3: Income eect
Note: This gure plots the estimated δt coecients of equation 5 with 95% condence intervals
around them. Results for two distinct outcome variables are displayed over time: the log median
regional purchase price (black), and the log mean regional purchase price (grey). Time is measured
on a monthly basis.
C Structural Model
We drop j subscripts with the understanding that the strategies and prices of opponent rms−j
are being held constant. Denote the exchange rate by γ and variable prot piemt, and recall that
Pm = exp(pim − fm)/(1 + exp(pi` − f`) + exp(pih)− fh))
∂Pm
∂γ
=
∂pim
∂γ
Pm(1− Pm)
∂pim
∂γ
=
∂sm
∂γ
(pm − γcm)− smcm
∂sm
∂γ
= α
∂pm
∂γ
sm(1− sm)
The optimally set price pm solves ∂pim/∂pm = 0, which implies p∗m = γcm − 1/α(1 − sm).
Taking implicit derivatives with respect to γ gives ∂p
∗
m
∂γ
= cm(1 − sm). Recursively substituting
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the expressions into each preceding line yields the expression for ∂Pm/∂γ:
∂Pm
∂γ
= −cm · sm(2− sm) · Pm(1− Pm) (C.1)
from which the elasticity Emγ ≡ ∂Pm∂γ γPm follows simply. It is straightforward to show that if
Ehγ < E`γ , then ∂(Ph/P`)/∂γ < 0.
We consider when the ratio of elasticities will be less than one:
Ehγ
E`γ < 1⇔
ch
c`
s∗h(2− s∗h)
s∗`(2− s∗`)
1− P ∗h
1− P ∗`
> 1
Using sh > s` ⇔ sh(2− sh) > s`(2− s`) for sh, s` ∈ (0, 1) and the logit structure of demand,
we have
Ehγ
E`γ < 1⇔
ch
c`
exp(qh + αp
∗
h)
exp(q` + αp∗`)
1− Ph
1− P` > 1 (C.2)
The primitives are cm, qm and fm; the marginal costs, qualities, and xed costs of providing
each of the qualities m ∈ {`, h}, respectively. Although there is no closed form solution for p∗m,
∂p∗m/∂cm > 0 and ∂P ∗m/∂cm < 0.
It is clear that since there are many degrees of freedom (i.e., many primitives that can be
varied), equation C.2 can be easily satised: for instance, with qh = q`, ch = c`, and fh < f`.
We are interested in whether it is possible for the high price, high quality good (ch > c` and
qh > q`) to be ex ante more protable (pih > pi`), but nonetheless dropped at a faster rate after
the shock, which will occur if equation C.2 is satised. To do so requires nding only one set of
parameters at which this is true, which is straightforward. For fh = f` = 1, ch = 3 > c` = 2,
and qh = −8 > q` = −9, we plot prot and entry probabilities for high and low quality products
as a function of the exchange rate parameter γ (as γ increases, the ruble devalues and marginal
costs increase). We also assume a total market size M of 5,000,000 units, total potential entrants
as 50,000, α = −0.32, and σ = 1 which are in line with our later structural estimation.
C.1 CES demand with free entry
In this section we show that a CES demand model with xed expenditure shares can match that
(1) there is no dierential pass-through for high-quality goods, and (2) quantities of high quality
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Figure C.1: Simulated prot for high and low products
Note: This gure plots simulated prots for high and low quality products.
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Figure C.2: Simulated entry probabilities for high and low products
Note: This gure plots simulated entry probabilities for high and low quality products.
goods are more responsive to a price change, as in our empirical results. However, we show that
this model cannot replicate the dierential reduction of high quality goods after the exchange
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rate shock. A reallocation of expenditure shares as in Bems and di Giovanni (2016) is necessary
to achieve quality downgrading.
Suppose we have a Cobb-Douglas utility function with CES aggregators over varieties of high
and low quality products:
U =
(∫ Nh
0
mh(ω)
σhqh(ω)
σh−1
σh ∂ω
)α· σh
σh−1
(∫ N`
0
m`(ω)
σ`q`(ω)
σ`−1
σ` ∂ω
)(1−α)· σ`
σ`−1
where Nh is the number of h goods, mh is the quality shifter for h goods, σh is the elasticity of
substitution between horizontally dierentiated varieties of h, and α is the xed income share
going to type h goods (similarly for ` variables). Suppose further that in the CES aggregators,
σh > σ` as in Medina (2018), so that demand for the high quality product is more elastic with
respect to price.45
If a representative consumer maximizes with respect to a budget constraint, we recover the
following demand functions:
qh =
αY mσhh p
−σh
h
P 1−σhh
, q` =
(1− α)Y mσ`` p−σ``
P 1−σ``
where P 1−σhh = Nhp
1−σh
h m
σh
h with symmetric products (similarly for `). Notice that the elasticity
of demand with respect to price is −σh for a high quality good and −σ` for a low quality good,
so given σh > σ` demand is more responsive for high quality goods, as in our empirical results.
Moreover, the elasticity of price with respect to the cost shock is equal for both high and low
quality goods, since optimal prices are a multiplicative markup of costs:
ph =
σh
(σh − 1)γch, p` =
σ`
(σ` − 1)γc`
Solving for pih = qh(ph − γch) − fh and setting it equal to zero, where γ is the cost shifter,
yields the equilibrium number of rms with free entry (similarly for `):
Nh =
αY
σhfh
, N` =
(1− α)Y
σ`f`
,
which does not depend on γ. Not only is there no dierential reduction in Nh in response to a
45Medina (2018) uses CES aggregators, but they are linearly additive instead of entering in a Cobb-Douglas format.
This allows expenditure shares to vary with income, which is key for her result.
57
cost increase γ > 1, the number of rms of both types is completely at in γ.
C.2 Demand estimation
In the model, prices are static within a season. However, as discussed in the data section, we
observe price and consumption variation within a season across months, and indeed this is the
primary source of our price variation for a product since products only last one season. We
therefore run a demand regression at the monthly level with product (j) and month (τ ) xed
eects to recover the price coecient α:
ln(sjτ ) = αpjτ + κj + κτ + h(j, τ) + ξjτ
Note that we do not need to include the outside share as it is time-varying only, and therefore
incorporated into κτ .
Since demand is dynamic, prices are lowered over time but demand does not necessarily
increase—purchasing a product late in the season for which it is intended (e.g., buying winter
boots in March) decreases utility from the purchase. The function h(j, τ) outputs how many
months it has been since a product j’s rst introduction; each number of months since intro-
duction is allowed to have a dierent intercept. We do not instrument for price for two reasons.
First, unobserved product-specic characteristics and dynamic demand are the main sources of
unobserved heterogeneity, and both are controlled for. Second, there is no good candidate for an
instrument: the exchange rate only aects the initial stock up of product and not month-to-month
prices, while the wholesale cost is not time-varying.
C.3 Expected prot approximation
Formally, piejmt(Pˆ−jt, θs) = E [pivm(a−jt, ·)] − fm, where the expectation is over the multinomial
distribution:
E [pivm(a−jt, ·)] =
∑
N`,Nh|N`t+Nht≤N˜t
N˜t!
N`t!Nht!(N˜t −Nht −N`t)!
·
PN`t`t P
Nht
ht (1− Pellt − Pht)N˜t−Nht−N`t · pivm(Nht, N`t, ·)
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Figure C.3: Orders and sales
Note: This gure shows the total quantity ordered by consumers (red dashed line) as well as the total
quantity actually sold to consumers (blue solid line) over time.
Since Nht and N`t are typically quite large, we approximate the expectation of the prot with the
prot of the expectations as in Ershov (2018). This implies
E[pivm(a−jt, ·)] ≈ pivm(N˜tPˆht, N˜tPˆ`t, ·),
which is straightforward to calculate. Simulations using the multivariate normal approxima-
tion to the multinomial and integration using sparse quadrature suggest the error from violating
Jensen’s inequality is not substantial.
C.4 Model t and counterfactuals
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Figure C.4: Structural model predicted probabilities of entry
Note: This gure shows the model predicted probability of entry for high (dashed red line, crosses) and
low (dashed blue line, diamonds) quality goods over time, and their relationship to the corresponding
probabilities of entry in the data (solid lines).
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Figure C.5: Welfare loss with alternative parameters
Note: This gure plots the welfare cost of the devaluation for various quality demand shifters, as-
suming the cost of high quality is 2.7 times that of low quality products, whose cost is held xed at
the estimated level. A value of one on the x-axis means no demand increase for high cost goods.
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